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Abstract 
Computer-related accidents have caused injuries and fatalities  in mining as well as other indus­
tries. Normal accident theory (NAT) explains that some accidents are inevitable because of system 
complexity. NAT is a classic argument in organizational sociology although it has been criticized as 
having imprecise deWnitions and lacking criteria for quantifying complexity. These limitations are 
addressed by a unique approach that recasts this organizational theory into an engineering-based 
methodology to quantify NAT complexities of computer-based systems. 
In this approach complexity is categorized as external or internal. External complexity is deWned by 
the external behavior of a system, and is quantiWed by these dependent variables: system predictability, 
observability, and usability. Dependent variable data contain the perceptions of 32 subjects running 
simulations of a system. The system’s internal complexity is characterized by modeling system-level 
requirements with the software cost reduction (SCR) formal method. Model attributes are quantiWed 
using 15 graph-theoretical metrics—the independent variables. Five of 15 metrics are correlated with 
the dependent variables as evidenced by structure correlations exceeding 0.25, with standard errors 
<0.10 and a 95% conWdence interval. The results also show that the system predictability, observabil­
ity, and usability decreased as NAT complexities increased. This research takes a step forward in oper­
ationalizing NAT for computerized systems. The research beneWts mining and other industries as well. 
1. Introduction 
Increasingly, computer technology is being embedded into a wide variety of systems. 
This technology can enable added Xexibility, provide new functionality, and help make sys­
tems more cost-competitive. Thus, traditional hardwired electro-mechanical and analog 
systems, having well-known and predictable failure modes, are often replaced with com­
puter hardware and software. This widespread use increases our dependence on and expo­
sure to computerized systems—more importantly, it greatly impacts safety. 
Computer-related accidents have caused harm to the environment, injuries, and fatali­
ties. Over 400 computer-related accidents were documented up to 1995 (Neumann, 1995); 
it was estimated that 2000 deaths were computer-related as of 1994 (MacKenzie, 1994). 
The safety issues of computerized systems have extended to the mining industry. Tradition­
ally thought of as low-tech, the industry is now using complex, computerized mining sys­
tems such as “driverless” underground and surface haulage vehicles, longwall mining 
machines, hoists and elevators, and mine atmospheric monitoring systems. From 1995 to 
2001, 11 computer-related mining incidents in the US were reported by the Mine Safety 
and Health Administration; 71 computer-related mining incidents were reported in Aus­
tralia (Sammarco, 2003). 
The problem is that we are ill-equipped to identify, understand, and manage the particu­
lar safety issues of computerized systems. Systems utilizing computer technology are more 
complex; as a result, new hazards are created that are diYcult to recognize or mitigate with 
traditional safety techniques. Traditional safety engineering techniques are being stretched 
to the limit because of many factors, including the “fast pace of technological change,” 
“new types of hazards,” and “increasing complexity and coupling” (Leveson, 2004). 
To engineer safer computer-based systems, new approaches are needed. One approach 
establishes a new accident model based on systems theory (Leveson, 2004). The model is 
intended as a theoretical foundation for new safety analyses and approaches. Another 
approach uses an interdisciplinary complexity model encompassing the six domains of 
mathematics, computer science, economics, psychology and cognitive sciences, social sci­
ence, and system science (Coskun and Grabowski, 2001). 
Addressing complexity is important in safety analysis because as computer-based sys­
tems proliferate, system sophistication and complexity escalate and increase the likelihood 
of design errors and the introduction of new hazards (Littlewood and Strigini, 1992). Nor­
mal accident theory (NAT) explains that some system accidents are inevitable because 
complex systems are highly interconnected, highly interactive, and tightly coupled (Perrow, 
1999). Although NAT is a classic approach in organizational sociology, it remains theoret­
ical rather than empirical. To our knowledge, only one attempt to operationalize NAT has 
been made, not for computer-based systems but for a specialized application to petroleum 
reWnery processing. 
This paper presents a new approach to operationalize NAT as an engineering-based 
methodology, with the goal of quantifying system-level complexities of computer-based 
systems. A methodology is presented for early complexity identiWcation and quantiWcation 
of system requirements. This enables an early assessment of NAT complexities that can 
impact safety before they are propagated to other life-cycle phases. Also, changes are gen­
erally easier and less costly to implement at the requirements phase. Armed with an eVec­
tive complexity assessment, one can compare options, target the requirements to simplify, 
and measure simpliWcation eVorts. 
The speciWc aims of this research to operationalize NAT as follows: 
1. Identify a formal modeling method for system requirements which will aVord quantiW­
cation of NAT attributes. 
2. Identify the NAT attributes to be operationalized with respect to system requirements. 
3. Identify potential metrics for each NAT attribute to be operationalized. 
4. Identify the metrics that are useful measures or indicators of NAT complexity. 
Several hypotheses (Table 1) are formed to help realize these speciWc aims. 
aT ble 1 
    A summary of the research hypotheses and associated rejection criteria 
  Null hypothesis H0	  Rejection criteria 
       (1) There is no correlation between NAT metrics and system predictability	  Structure correlation 7 .250 
       (2) There is no correlation between NAT metrics and system observability	  Standard error 6 .100 
       (3) There is no correlation between NAT metrics and system usability	   95% ConWdence interval 
does not cross zero 
     (4) Increasing complexity does not decrease system predictability	   Wilcoxon sign-ranks test 
     (5) Increasing complexity does not decrease system observability	 
     (6) Increasing complexity does not decrease system usability	 
Z 6 ¡1.645 
p-Value 6 .05 
2. Normal accident theory 
Perrow, an organizational theorist, is the originator of NAT. His work emerged in 1979 
when he was advising a Presidential commission investigating the accident at Three Mile 
Island (TMI Harrisburg, PA). In essence, Perrow identiWed system complexity as the 
primary accident cause; thus, the TMI accident was labeled a normal accident because this 
type of accident is inevitable with complex technological systems (Perrow, 1999). 
NAT identiWes two important system characteristics—interactive complexity and tight 
coupling—that make complex systems especially prone to system accidents. Interactively 
complex systems have the potential to generate many branching paths among subsystems. 
These interactions can be unexpected, unplanned, incomprehensible, and even unperceiv­
able to system designers or system users. Coupling is a measure of the strength of the inter-
connectedness between system components. Tightly coupled systems have little or no 
slack; thus, they rapidly respond to and propagate perturbations such that operators do 
not have the time or ability to determine what is wrong. As a result, human intervention is 
unlikely or improper. 
2.1. NAT limitations 
NAT is limited in its applicability. First, it addresses a narrow category of accidents— 
industrial disasters of unforeseen events resulting in great damage and loss. Thus, it has not 
been extended to more commonly encountered accidents of limited scope. Secondly, NAT 
addresses safety in the context of organizational structures for complex, industrial systems 
such as nuclear power plans, oil reWneries, and chemical plants. Thus, it does not focus on 
the details of the system and its components. Thirdly, the theory has not been extended to 
computerized systems using software. This limitation is realized by Perrow: “The metaphor 
         
   
 
    
 
   
    
  
    
    
       
       
   
 
    
of an accident residing in the complexity and coupling of the system itself, not in the fail­
ures of its components has seeped into many areas where I never thought to apply it” (Per­
row, 1999, p. 354). Perrow cites software as a neglected or new area to consider. 
NAT is also limited by a lack of reWnement in deWning and quantifying its terms and 
concepts. “Ill-deWned concepts” and “the absence of criteria for measuring complexity and 
coupling” have been cited as signiWcant limitations (Hopkins, 1999). Quantitative measures 
of interactive complexity and coupling would address these limitations and could serve to 
promote the theory in new areas. 
2.2. Related NAT research 
The validity and application of NAT to petroleum reWneries has been researched (Wolf, 
2000). A reWnery system was modeled as a hierarchy of system units, links, and nodes. 
Links are the system pipes that carry raw material, byproducts, Wnal product, and wastes. 
Nodes are points of connection and interconnection between unit processes and links. 
They are also the points for control and monitoring of parameters such as Xow, pressure, 
and temperature. Using this system model, a “reWnery-speciWc” index of complexity was 
created based on reWnery process knowledge and the number of unit processes, links, and 
nodes. This index, Ciplant, served to quantify and estimate the interactive complexity for a 
reWnery. Ciplant represented the maximum number of states the system could exist. 
Wolf’s conclusions support the validity of NAT. ReWneries characterized by high com­
plexity and tight coupling had more occurrences of accidental releases of hazardous mate­
rials and more Wres and explosions. However, two limitations are evident in this research. 
First, the index of complexity Ciplant is speciWc to reWneries and is not generalized to other 
applications. Second, NAT was validated for a narrow spectrum of accidents: reWnery 
disasters involving untoward releases of hazardous material, Wres, and explosions. There­
fore, NAT was not expanded to other types of accidents besides disasters. 
Coskun and Grabowski (2001) addressed the challenge of measuring complexity by 
using an integrated metrics approach. This approach used an interdisciplinary complexity 
model encompassing six domains. This interdisciplinary complexity model was used to 
measure the complexity of software. Software complexity is important to address but soft­
ware metrics alone are not suYcient to address safety because safety is an emergent prop­
erty of the system. 
3. Operationalizing NAT 
Operationalizing NAT transfers the theory to practice by establishing concrete, quanti-
Wable measures of system complexity. The operationalization process involves establishing 
a conceptualized system model, identifying which NAT attributes to measure, and deWning 
multiple metrics to measure or indicate the NAT attributes. 
3.1. System model 
The Wrst challenge is to formally model the speciWed behavior (requirements) of a 
system. System requirements deWne what the system shall do, deWning system behavior by 
specifying system inputs (stimuli), system outputs (responses), and the behavioral relation­
ships between the inputs and outputs. The model needs to provide an abstraction to 
       
  
    
      
      
    
            
     
   
    
    
  
        
    
     
         
         
      
        
         
     
      
      
    
identify the most important system features, elements, and relationships. The model also 
needs to enable direct or indirect measurements of internal complexity and coupling. 
The software cost reduction (SCR) method was used for specifying and modeling a sys­
tem model. SCR is based on the Parnas four-variable model. This model is a black box 
view of system inputs, outputs, and external behavior; thus, the model captures the 
required external behavior, devoid of implementation or structural design aspects. SCR is 
based on a Wnite state machine model of the system where the system L is a 4-tuple, 
0L D (Em , S, s , T), where Em D set of input events, S D set of system states, s0 D set of initial 
states with s0 � S, and T D the system transform (Heitmeyer et al., 1998). 
Additionally, an integrated environment called the SCR toolset was developed for for­
mally specifying, modeling, simulating, and analyzing complex systems. The toolset 
includes a Dependency Graph Browser that displays dependencies between SCR model 
variables as a directed graph (Fig. 1). The dependency graph also provides a mapping of 
controlled variables (outputs) to monitored variables (inputs). Each variable is depicted as 
a node; an arrow represents a dependency between nodes where value of the variable at the 
tail depends on the value of the variable at the head. Another tool is available for creating 
a user interface for the system model. The user interface can provide transparent control of 
system simulations. 
Fig. 1. An SCR dependency graph. Source: Naval Research Laboratories. 
3.2. NAT attributes 
NAT identiWes 13 attributes of complex systems and categorizes them as either interac­
tively complex or tightly coupled. Our research established a more abstract categorization 
of external and internal complexity as part of our inductive process to identify the NAT 
attributes to operationalize. 
External complexity was characterized with three variables: system predictability, 
observability, and usability. These variables were viewed in the context of an operator 
interacting with the system. Situations of poor system predictability, observability, and 
   
  
    
    
     
     
      
    
      
     
      
    
    
      
     
      
       
        
       
       
      
     
        
      
 
      
       
     
 
      
    
   
    
usability can contribute to human error or worse, mishaps. For instance, predictability 
concerns unfamiliar, unplanned, or unexpected system behaviors as viewed system’s opera­
tor. These behaviors can result in unplanned machine movements or unexpected machine 
startups. A speciWc example concerns unpredictable mining machine movements that 
occurred in the US and Australia that in some cases resulted in injury or even fatalities 
(Sammarco, 2003). Complex system behaviors can also be transparent making them diY­
cult to observe or comprehend by the end-user (Perrow, 1999). Observability also declines 
if the end-user is overwhelmed with information as happened to operators during the 
Three Mile Island mishap. Poor predictability and observability can negatively impact sys­
tem usability. Hence, system complexity can be indicated by an external component char­
acterized with three variables: system predictability, observability, and usability. These 
were the dependent variables for our research. 
Internal complexity concerns a system’s internal structure. Internal complexity was 
characterized by modeling system requirements with SCR, and quantifying NAT attri­
butes represented in a SCR dependency graph with graph-theoretical metrics—the inde­
pendent variables. SpeciWc NAT attributes to operationalize were identiWed by deduction: 
(1) abstracting NAT attributes of complexity to a generalized view of simple (linear) and 
complex (nonlinear) systems; (2) selecting a subset of NAT attributes pertaining to linear 
and nonlinear systems; (3) identifying a general set of metrics to measure or indicate the 
subset of NAT attributes. 
3.3. System linearity 
Simple systems are linear. A single line of dominos provides an example. A single distur­
bance of a domino starts a linear chain of events where one domino pushes over the next. 
This chain of events follows a highly observable, predictable, and linear sequence of events. 
Nonlinear systems are complex. They have multiple branching paths to system compo­
nents and subsystems; hence, nonlinear systems are highly interconnected. A car wind­
shield provides a nonlinear system example. A single disturbance, such as a stone hitting 
the windshield, results in multitudes of nonlinear, interconnected cracks. The extent and 
pattern of the crack is unpredictable and incomprehensible. 
A high-level abstraction of system linearity was used to select a subset of three attributes 
pertaining to linearity from the 13 NAT attributes. The resulting NAT attributes were 
interconnectivity, common-mode connections, and multiple control parameters. A set of 
15 metrics were proposed to operationalize these NAT attributes. 
3.4. Metrics 
Graph-theoretical metrics were used to measure system linearity of SCR dependency graphs. 
For instance, interconnectivity was indicated by using McCabe’s cyclomatic complex­
ity V(g)—the number of linearly independent paths.
Fig. 2. A simple linear system having one path. 
 The directed graph of Fig. 2 depicts 
  
        
       
     
         
        
        
     
 
     
a simple system where V(g) D 1; thus, the single path from v1 to v4 indicates very 
low interconnectivity. A nonlinear system is depicted by Fig. 3, where V(g) D 5; 
thus, the Wve linearly independent paths from v1 to v4 indicate more system interconnec­
tivity. 
Common-mode connections increase as a system becomes more nonlinear. For instance, 
vertices v2, v3, and v4 of Fig. 3 have a common-mode connection established by vertex v1. 
Vertex v2 is another common-mode connecting v2 to v3, v4, and to itself via a self loop at 
v2. The out-degree metric quantiWes a common-mode connection. The out-degrees of verti­
ces v1 and v3 are od(v1) D 3 and od(v2) D 3. By comparison, od(v1) D 1 and od(v2) D 1 for 
the simple linear system of Fig. 2. 
Fig. 3. A nonlinear system having Wve paths. 
Multiple control parameters are used to determine the paths of control in a graph. The 
number of control parameters increases as a system becomes more nonlinear. For instance, 
the number of edges into a vertex (in-degree) is indicative of the quantity of control param­
eters for that vertex. The in-degree of vertex v4 (Fig. 3) is three in comparison to a value of 
one for vertex v4 (Fig. 2). 
This section has presented just a few of the metrics for the NAT attributes of intercon­
nectivity, common-mode connections, and multiple, interacting control parameters. Ulti­
mately, a set of 15 metrics {X1 ,X2,X3, ƒ , X15} were identiWed as candidates to 
operationalize NAT. This set of metrics was based on three system abstractions and pro­
jections (perspectives). The rationale was that a single abstraction or projection could not 
aVord all the necessary metrics because complexity is multidimensional. These abstractions 
were created from SCR dependency graphs, as follows: 
•	 Scenario subgraph; a course-grained abstraction induced by the dependency graph 
edges and vertexes that are used for a given set of user tasks. 
•	 Critical-state subgraph; a medium-grained abstraction derived from the scenario sub-
graph. 
•	 Critical-vertex subgraph; a Wne-grained abstraction for each vertex of the critical-state 
subgraph. 
These projections were created for the three subgraph abstractions: 
•	 Input projection; a view of all dependencies with respect to the input vertices (i.e., all the 
ancestors of a given input vertex). 
•	 Output projection; a view of all dependencies with respect to the output vertices (i.e., all 
the descendents of a given output vertex). 
•	 All projection; a view of all dependencies with respect to input and output vertices. 
    
 
    
       
       
  
        
       
         
 
         
        
   
     
       
    
        
    
    
 
   
        
4. Methodology 
4.1. Research procedures 
Dependent variable data were obtained from subject perceptions of a PC-based simula­
tion of a light control system (LCS). The experiment consisted of two major parts. First, 
subjects learned the operation of the LCS. Next, subjects followed written instructions to 
run three test scenarios on a PC-based LCS simulator; each scenario was a set of typical 
user tasks. After each scenario was completed, subjects answered a questionnaire concern­
ing subject perceptions of the LCS, took a short break, and then began the next test sce­
nario. 
The questionnaire was used to quantify the dependent variables. It was based on two 
respected and validated instruments: the questionnaire for user interaction satisfaction 
(Human Computer Interaction Laboratory, 2004) and the software usability measurement 
inventory (Human Factors Research Group, 2004). Closed and open-ended questions were 
used, with a Wve-level Likert scale from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest) for the closed-ended ques­
tions. A portion of the questionnaire is given in Appendix. 
4.2. Research design 
The design was based on a cross-over design—a standard design with an established 
validity. The research also used a standard usability evaluation method called the discount 
usability engineering method. 
The cross-over design used two treatments (A and B) and two washout periods (breaks). 
The independent variables were manipulated to increase NAT complexity for treatment A; 
treatment B had the independent variables manipulated to decrease complexity. A washout 
or waiting period was established between treatments to minimize carryover or residual 
learning eVects from the prior treatments. The washout periods were just a few minutes 
because the residual eVects were not physiological. Also, short washout periods were 
needed to keep the total test time relatively short. Lengthy washout periods could have 
confounded data because of subject fatigue or boredom. 
The basic sequence was to give half the subjects treatment A, let the subjects rest during 
the washout period, and then have subjects receive treatment B. The other half of the sub­
jects had the same treatments, but the order was reversed. Thus, given these sequences, the 
cross-over design had signiWcant advantages: the subjects served as their own control, there 
was greater sample size eYciency with randomization of treatment order, and all subjects 
received all the treatments. 
Treatments A and B were both applied to each of the three scenarios. The sequence of 
scenarios and treatments were optimized for a cross-over design (Jones and Kenward, 
1998). Tables 2 and 3 list the test sequences. Half the subjects were randomly assigned to 
sequence 1 and the other half to sequence 2. 
The discount usability engineering method was used to evaluate system usability, which 
was a dependent variable. The method uses three techniques: scenarios, simpliWed thinking 
aloud technique, and heuristic evaluation. The simpliWed thinking aloud technique encour­
ages the subjects to vocalize their thoughts as they perform typical tasks. Observers 
   
      
       
    
       
   
      
recorded these thoughts and encouraged the users to vocalize their thoughts and provide 
user feedback. 
   
 
Table 2 
Sequence 1 ordering of scenarios and treatments 
Order Scenario Treatment 
0 a 
1 b 
2 1 A 
3 b 
4 2 B 
5 b 
6 3 A 
7 b 
8 2 A 
9 b 
10 1 B 
11 b 
12 3 B 
a—Warm-up session. 
b—Washout period. 
   
 
Table 3 
Sequence 2 ordering of scenarios and treatments 
Order Scenario Treatment 
0 a 
1 b 
2 3 B 
3 b 
4 1 B 
5 b 
6 2 A 
7 b 
8 3 A 
9 b 
10 2 B 
11 b 
12 1 A 
a—Warm-up session. 
b—Washout period. 
4.3. Research vehicle 
The light control system (LCS) was used as the research test vehicle. The LCS require­
ments were formalized as a case study by the Fraunhofer Institute for Experimental Soft­
ware Engineering for requirements engineering seminars (Queins et al., 2000). The LCS 
oVered several advantages for research. First, “the light control case study is an example of 
a nontrivial reactive system” (Kronenburg and Peper, 2000). It represented a relatively 
complex, real-world system in that it required sensors, actuators, software, human machine 
    
     
            
      
          
   
 
     
    
    
       
     
      
      
       
      
       
    
      
    
     
 
      
  
   
      
   
      
   
      
 
interfaces, automatic control functions, manual override functions, and fault management 
functions for the detection, annunciation, and tolerance of faults. Lastly, it aVorded 
human/computer interaction. 
The LCS was to control the interior lighting of a building consisting of various oYces, 
laboratories, hallways, and staircases such that energy was not wasted and such that a safe 
environment was maintained for normal and abnormal conditions. An oYce environment is 
relatively benign with respect to safety. Loss of lighting can result in trip and fall hazards. 
More dangerous hazards would exist if the LCS was used in an industrial environment such 
as underground mining where moving equipments, rotating machinery, high-voltage electri­
cal circuits, and unstable roof conditions are common. Several LCS requirements speciW­
cally address fault tolerance and safety aspects applicable to safety-related applications. 
BrieXy, the LCS provides automatic and manual control for two groups of oYce lights: 
one group is near the window and the other is near the wall. The control enables the user to 
set two light scenes named occupied and vacant. The occupied light scene automatically 
maintains a user-deWned lighting intensity and light group conWguration when the oYce is 
occupied. The oYce lights are also dynamically controlled to provide a constant level of 
illumination in spite of variations in sunlight entering the oYce. The vacant light scene 
automatically provides a user-deWned light intensity and conWguration if the oYce is 
vacated for an extended time that the user deWnes. Lastly, the LCS provides manual light­
ing control to over-ride the automatic controls. Manual pushbutton switches enable on/oV 
control of each light group. 
The LCS components consist of sensors, a logic solver, wall and window light actuators, 
and a user-interface panel. Five sensors are used; a motion sensor detects an occupied or 
vacant oYce; an analog sensor measures natural light in the oYce; a door closed contact 
indicates the door is open or closed; two status-line sensors indicate if the lights are turned 
on or oV. The logic solver is PC-based and it provides control functions and a user-inter­
face. Manual pushbutton switches enable manual control of each light. 
The LCS system-level requirements were modeled using the SCR toolset. These require­
ments deWned end-user needs, nonfunctional needs, and the required behavior of the sys­
tem hardware components that included Wve sensors, two actuators, two pushbuttons, and 
two graphical user interfaces (GUIs). A model of nonideal LCS behavior (Heitmeyer and 
Bharadwaj, 2000) was expanded to provide new functionality needed by the research. A 
new PC-based GUI for the LCS was also created. The control requirements for oYces and 
laboratory spaces were identical; therefore, the problem space was scoped to a model for a 
single oYce for the research described by this paper. 
4.4. Subjects 
Thirty-two subjects from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
participated in testing. All subjects were recruited as volunteers by word of mouth. Thirty-
two subjects participated in the LCS tests and are characterized as follows based upon sub­
ject data collected during pre-test activities: 
• 78.1%—technical job classiWcation; 
• 71.8%—45–65 years old; 
• 87.3%—male; 
• 100%—no prior involvement in the research; 
 
   
    
      
        
     
    
  
     
    
         
      
    
       
   
        
       
 
     
       
         
 
       
   
• 84.4%—no knowledge of the light control system test vehicle; 
• 84.4%—PC experience rated at 4 or 5 (expert). 
4.5. Observers 
Three additional volunteers were test observers that administered the tests. The observ­
ers did not know the purpose of the research nor understand the operation of the LCS. 
This was intentional so as to reduce the potential for observer-induced biases. 
The observers gave the subjects instructional material for the using the LCS and GUI. 
Multiple delivery methods were used for instruction to accommodate subjects who learn 
by reading, watching, listening, or by hands-on activities. First, subjects watched a narrated 
PowerPoint presentation giving an overview of LCS. The presentation contained a video 
that provided a dynamic example of using the LCS and GUI. Next, written instructions 
were given. Lastly, the observers instructed subjects to run a warm-up session to gain 
hands-on experience. 
Observers also collected the subject questionnaires and qualitative data in the form of 
observer notes. During the testing, observers took notes on each subject’s verbal com­
ments, actions, and body language with respect to predictability, observability, and usabil­
ity. The qualitative data of observer notes were quantiWed by using a process of 
categorizing the data to the dependent variables and mapping the data to a Wve-point Lik­
ert scale. Once the observer data were quantiWed, the mean values for each category were 
weighted by 30%, and then combined with questionnaire data for predictability, observ­
ability, and usability. 
5. Results and discussion 
5.1. Subject responses 
The frequency of subject responses for each scenario and treatment were depicted by 
histograms. In general, the treatment B histograms for predictability, observability, and 
usability are skewed to the right (the highest level 5) more than the histograms for treat­
ment A. This indicates that treatment B (less complex) was generally perceived as having 
better predictability, observability, and usability than treatment A. 
Table 4 lists the median and mode subject responses for predictability, observability, 
and usability for treatments A and B.
 
      











A B A B A B 
Predictability median 2.42 4.38 2.5 4.67 2.64 4.95 
Predictability mode 3.0 5.0 2.5 5.0 4.67 5.0 
Observability median 3.79 4.38 3.99 4.6 4.14 5.0 
Observability mode 3.86 4.0 5.0 5.0 4.71 5.0 
Usability median 3.75 4.67 4.0 4.5 4.04 4.25 
Usability mode 4.25 5.0 4.0 5.0 4.5 5.0 
Observations of these data also indicate that 
       




     
 
       
      
treatment B was more predictable, observable, and usable because the median and mode 
values for treatment B are all greater than for treatment A with only one exception—the 
mode values are equal for observability of scenario 2. 
5.2. Internal validity analyses 
All subjects answered all questions of the questionnaire each time they completed a sce­
nario. The questionnaire data had numerous internal validity checks to identify confound­
ing, or invalid data, to assess data reliability, and to evaluate subject learning and fatigue 
eVects. 
Each potential threat is listed and discussed as follows: 
•	 Data confounding from the scenario instructions. Subject responses for the dependent 
variables predictability, observability, and usability could be biased due to subjects 
having diYculty following and understanding scenario instructions. This seems 
unlikely based on the warm-up data for variable W1—the mean value for the subject’s 
ease of following and understanding the warm-up instructions. Of 28 subjects, 24 
rated W1 very favorably with a greater than 3.94 out of a maximum of 5.0. The distri­
bution for W1 had a positive skew to the right (the highest score) as depicted by 
Fig. 4. 
•	 Data confounding from the graphical user interface (GUI). Biased responses for the 
dependent variables predictability, observability, and usability could be due to subjects 
having diYculty with the GUI. This seems unlikely based on the warm-up data for var­
iable W2—the mean value for the subject’s ease of using the GUI to run the warm-up. 
Of 28 subjects, 24 rated W2 greater than 3.58 out of a maximum of 5.0 score. The dis­
tribution for W2 had a positive skew to the right (the highest score) as depicted by 
Fig. 4. 
•	 Invalid data. All subjects answered all questions of the questionnaire; however, data 
from four subjects were eliminated because of consistent strings of high ratings and 
because these data were inconsistent with observer data. For instance, out of 36 ques­
tions, 34 were rated 5.0 (highest rating) and two questions were rated 4.0. This con­
trasted with the observer’s data which indicated much lower ratings. 
Fig. 4. Mean subject responses for the warm-up session. Graph (A) depicts the ease of following and understand­
ing the warm-up instructions. Graph (B) depicts the GUIs ease of use. 
  
       
     
      
 
      
    
        
    
   
   
       
      
  
       
•	 Data reliability. The data reliability was accepted given Cronbach’s r D .811. An r of .70 
or higher is a typical benchmark of acceptability. 
•	 Learning eVects or subject fatigue. From inspection of data trends, one can infer learning 
eVects and fatigue. A positive-sloped trend could be an indication that subjects are 
learning more as time progresses; thus, they would rate dependent variables with a 
higher value. A negative-sloped trend could be an indication of subject fatiguing as time 
increases, so they would rate dependent variables with a lower value. The data trends for 
the sequences 1 and 2 test orders were used to infer data confounding from learning 
eVects or fatigue. Fig. 5 depicts the data trends for sequence 1. Data confounding was 
not detected in either graph of sequence 1 or 2 data trends. 
Fig. 5. The mean values of each dependent variable for the sequence 1 test order. N D 14 subjects. 
5.3. Hypotheses testing 
Hypotheses 1–3 concern the existence of correlations between subject perceptions of the 
system (the dependent variables of predictability, observability, and usability) and the set 
of 15 NAT metrics of system complexity (the independent variables). Testing of hypotheses 
1–3 used canonical correlation analysis (CCA) and structure correlations. 
CCA is a multivariate analysis technique used to identify multiple correlations between 
sets of independent and dependent variables. CCA produces a set of paired canonical vari­
ates representing the independent and dependent variables so as to maximize the correla­
tion. The canonical variates consist of weighted sets of the original variables. The 
weightings are called canonical coeYcients. 
These raw canonical coeYcients can be diYcult to interpret, but structure correlations 
are very useful to facilitate their interpretations (CliV, 1987; Shafto et al., 1997). Structure 
correlations are derived from the raw canonical coeYcients and represent the Pearson cor­
relation of each original variable to the canonical variate. 
The results showed structure correlations exceeding .25 for Wve metrics. The Wve NAT 
metrics that correlated with the dependent variables are listed in Table 5. The structure 
correlations for the Wrst pair of canonical variates are depicted in Fig. 6. 
  
   
     
    
        
    
      
 




The NAT attribute metrics and their associated abstractions and projections 





















        
  
Fig. 6. A graphical depiction of structure correlations for the Wrst pair of canonical variates. Note the negative 
correlation between the canonical variates. 
The bootstrap re-sampling method (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993) was used to obtain the 
estimates of standard error and the 95% conWdence limit for the structure correlations. The 
bootstrap method takes repeated samples to approximate the distribution of the original 
population. The re-sampling was done preserving the treatment group sample sizes. The 
results of 1000 bootstrap samples were standard errors of less than .10, and a statistically 
signiWcant 95% conWdence interval as listed in Table 6. 
 
       
Table 6 


































A Wilcoxon signed-ranks test was used to test null hypotheses 4–6—increasing NAT 
complexity does not decrease system predictability, observability, and usability. The results 
(Table 7) showed that subjects perceived the test scenario outcomes of the complex system 
(treatment A) as less predictable, observable, and usable in comparison to the simpler 
system (treatment B). The statistical signiWcance measure was determined by using 1-tailed 
p-values. 
    
          
      
     
       
       
      
    
    
      
    
  
      
        
      
  
    
  
        
     
    
     
      
5.4. Discussion 
Test results for hypotheses 1–3, as depicted by Fig. 6, show negative structure correla­
tions for the canonical variate composed of the original dependent variables (note that a 
perfect negative correlation is ¡1). Therefore, as the independent variables X13, X7, X5, 
X2, and X6 increase, the dependent variables of predictability, observability, and usability 
decrease. 
The statistical test results (Table 7) for hypotheses 4–6 indicate that treatment A 
was perceived by subjects as more complex than treatment B. These results were statis­
tically signiWcant given that the  p-values exceeded the statistical signiWcance level of 
0.05. 
   
 
 
    
Table 7 
Wilcoxon signed-ranks test results for treatments A and B 
Wilcoxon signed-ranks Predictability Observability Usability 









¤ Statistical signiWcance <.001 (1-tailed). 
a Based on negative ranks. 
In summary, the null hypotheses 1–6 were all rejected given the statistical signiWcance of 
test results and the steps taken to guard internal validity. 
5.5. Implications 
A methodology for the quantiWcation of NAT complexities for system-level require­
ments was presented. Early quantiWcation of NAT complexities impacting safety could 
help system designers identify, analyze, and mitigate safety-related system complexities 
before they are propagated to subsequent life-cycle phases. Safety is an emergent property 
of the system, so safety must be addressed at the system level as done by this research. This 
is in contrast a safety approach that quantiWes attributes of the software subsystem. This 
does not address the system directly and also would take place much later in the system life 
cycle when the software is already written. Thus, system modiWcations would be more diY­
cult and costly to correct. 
6. Conclusions 
This work is a promising and signiWcant step in meeting the research objective: to oper­
ationalize NAT for the system-level requirements of safety-related computer systems. 
The research objective was partially realized. This claim is qualiWed as partial 
because the research was limited to one system and 32 test subjects; more empirical 
research is needed to establish external validity. Two arguments support this qualiWed 
claim. First, there was a statistically signiWcant, negative correlation between Wve NAT 
metrics of complexity and the externally visible system attributes of predictability, 
observability, and usability. Secondly, each of the speciWc aims for operationalizing NAT 
was realized. 
•	 SpeciWc aim 1. Identify a formal modeling method for system requirements which will 
aVord quantiWcation of NAT attributes. 
The SCR models and simulations successfully served the research needs for modeling, 
simulating, and analyzing human-computer interactions in the context of NAT. The 
SCR dependency graphs accommodated multiple levels of system abstraction and the 
multiple projections needed for speciWc aim 3. Secondly, the SCR toolset successfully 
supported simulation of our model. Subjects were able to quickly learn (in about 
10 min) to run the simulation and eVectively understand the simulation such that useful 
data were collected. 
•	 SpeciWc aim 2. Identify the NAT attributes to be operationalized with respect to system 
requirements. 
A process of deduction enabled us to ascertain that three of 13 NAT attributes can be 
observed in SCR dependency models of system requirements. Our premise was that 
NAT attributes could be generalized to linearity. Complex systems are nonlinear; simple 
systems are linear. From this premise, our reasoning led us to identify three NAT attri­
butes to operationalize: interconnectivity, common-mode connections, and multiple 
control parameters. 
•	 SpeciWc aim 3. Identify potential metrics for each NAT attribute to be operationalized. 
This aim was satisWed as evidenced by 15 metrics proposed to measure or indicate the 
three NAT attributes from speciWc aim 2. We infer a degree of validity to the proposed 
metrics because our selection process addressed the multidimensional aspects of com­
plexity by using multiple system abstractions and perspectives to obtain our metrics. 
•	 SpeciWc aim 4. Identify the metrics that are useful measures of NAT complexity. Analy­
sis results showed that Wve out of the 15 proposed metrics had structure correlations 
exceeding .25, standard errors of less than .10, and statistically signiWcant conWdence 
intervals. 
6.1. Limitations 
Limitations of this research are as follows: 
•	 Predictive limitations. The research did not develop mathematical models and inference 
procedures to identify and assign a probability to future outcomes; one thus cannot 
make outcome predictions based solely on the metric values. 
•	 Limited subject diversity. The data from our volunteer subject characterizations indi­
cates a relatively homogenous group of people. This can potentially threaten external 
validity with respect to generalizations to other populations. We infer that it was 
more diYcult to elicit negative subject perceptions of system predictability, observ­
ability, and usability (the dependent variables) because the typical subject was 
an engineer with considerable analytical abilities and experiences with technical sys­
tems. 
•	 Unknown external validity. The resulting set of independent variables X13, X7, X5, X2, 
and X6 and the rejection of the null hypotheses were based on statistically signiWcant 
test results speciWc to the data set. It is not known if these independent variables are 
       
 
useful for other systems, or if the same inferences concerning the six research hypotheses 
pertain to other systems. 
Appendix 
This appendix contains a portion of the subject questionnaire. The questions are for sce­
nario 1, treatment B. All scenarios and treatments had identical questions. 
System predictability 
3.1 What is your initial opinion of the system’s behavior? 
3.1.1	 confusing understandable
 








1 2 3 4 5
 
3.2	 How diYcult is anticipating the system’s output or behavior? 
diYcult easy 
1 2 3 4 5 
System observability 
3.3 Does the system keep you informed about its status or state? 
3.3.1	 never always
 




1 2 3 4 5
 
3.4	 Recognizing a change in the system’s status is 
diYcult easy 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.5	 Understanding the meaning or implications of a change in system’s status is 
diYcult easy 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.6	 Recognizing changes in the display information is 
diYcult easy 
1 2 3 4 5 
System usability 
3.7	 The ability to Wnd information is 
diYcult easy 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.8	 Can the scenario be performed in a straight-forward manner? 
never always 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.9	 Rate the scenario’s complexity. 
high low 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.10 Please write any comments. You may use the back of this page. 
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